---
title: "Fireworks AI’s breach reached 149,346 Uber drivers, Notion and Cursor"
summary: "Uber’s state filings and the bulletins of Fireworks, Notion, Cursor and Barracuda, 9 October to 13 November: how access handed to AI vendors became the way in."
url: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/fireworks-breach-uber-149346-drivers-ai-vendor-keys
format: Analysis
desk: "Security"
area: "Risk & compliance"
region: Global
published: 2026-11-17
facts_checked: 2026-11-17
author: TechBag (The TechBag Journal)
tags: ["Uber data breach","Fireworks AI breach","Uber driver data breach","Barracuda breach","Notion security incident","Cursor security incident","Fireworks AI","Uber","Barracuda","Notion AI","third-party AI vendor","vendor access keys","long-lived credentials","third-party risk","driver's licence data","CERT-In six hours","DPDP data processor"]
cover: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/covers/fireworks-breach-uber-149346-drivers-ai-vendor-keys.png
---

# Fireworks AI’s breach reached 149,346 Uber drivers, Notion and Cursor

*Uber’s state filings and the bulletins of Fireworks, Notion, Cursor and Barracuda, 9 October to 13 November: how access handed to AI vendors became the way in.*

Analysis · Security · Risk & compliance · By TechBag · Published 2026-11-17 · Facts checked 2026-11-17 · Canonical: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/fireworks-breach-uber-149346-drivers-ai-vendor-keys

The short version

1. Uber has notified 149,346 people that their data was taken through a vendor, Fireworks AI, which runs open-weight AI models for other companies. Uber says the intruder used the vendor’s own internal credentials to open Uber’s account with it; TechCrunch reports the data as drivers’ names, addresses, dates of birth and licence numbers.[1][3][4]
2. The same breach reached Notion, which lost AI chat transcripts from fewer than 1% of its workspaces, and Cursor, where a key it had issued to Fireworks led to a fake extension served to at most 5,000 users.[7][8]
3. Separately, Barracuda says a cloud key it gave a different, unnamed AI vendor and never retired let an attacker touch about 10 of its cloud accounts in about 44 hours. Each company says it has since cut, shortened or expired the access it had handed over.[9][10]

Companies give AI vendors two things: data to run models on, and keys to reach it. Between 9 October and 13 November, five companies disclosed what happened when that access was used by someone else. A security or procurement head who has signed up an AI vendor this year needs to know how the access was used, what each customer lost, and what each says it changed. We read Uber’s state filings and its letter to those affected, the bulletins of Fireworks, Notion, Cursor and Barracuda, and Railway’s incident report.

## Uber: 149,346 people, reached with the vendor’s own credentials

Uber reported the breach to Oregon’s Department of Justice on 10 November. Its entry gives 149,346 people affected, a breach date of 1 October, 9 October as the day Uber discovered it, and 10 November as the day notices went out.[1] Its California entry gives the breach date as Wednesday, 7 October.[2]

149,346

people Uber notified, in its filing with Oregon's Department of Justice on 10 November

Rhode Island’s 1,873 residents, the one state count in Uber’s letter, are about 1.25% of them.[3]

The letter, dated 10 November, says how. “On October 9, 2026, a service provider notified Uber that an unauthorized third party had compromised the service provider’s internal credentials and used them to access Uber’s account with the service provider.” Uber “immediately severed data connections with the service provider”, and on 13 October its investigation found that the intruder had used those credentials “to access Uber data connected to the service provider”. Uber offers credit monitoring through Cyberscout, to be taken up within 90 days, and says it has “not identified any misuse” of the data.[3]

The letter leaves the data fields as a template placeholder. TechCrunch, which read the notices filed in several states, reports names, addresses, dates of birth and driver’s licence numbers. An Uber spokesperson told it: “The notices to drivers are in relation to a security incident impacting one of our third-party vendors, Fireworks.ai, which had access to some Uber data.” Uber also said, as TechCrunch reports it, that it had alerts set for unauthorised access to its Fireworks environment, but because the intruder used Fireworks’ own internal credentials, “no alerts were triggered”.[4]

**Figure: Uber's data was opened with its vendor's own credentials, so Uber's alerts did not fire**

*The access chain in Uber's notice letter and statements, 1 October to 10 November 2026*

1. 01Data at the vendorUber kept an account with Fireworks, and Uber data was “connected to” it, in the letter’s words.
2. 02The vendor’s keysAn outsider compromised Fireworks’ internal credentials. Fireworks found the misuse on 6 October.
3. 03Inside Uber’s accountThose credentials opened Uber’s account. Uber’s alerts for unauthorised access did not trigger, Uber said.
4. 04LettersTold on 9 October, confirmed on 13 October; notices to 149,346 people from 10 November.

Source: Uber notice letter of 10 November 2026; Oregon DOJ breach list; Uber to TechCrunch, 16 November 2026 · as of 17 November 2026

ReportedWho names whom

Uber’s letter and state entries say “a service provider”, and Fireworks’ bulletins name no customer. The link between the two rests on Uber’s spokesperson’s statement to TechCrunch.[3][4][6]

## One vendor, at least three customers, five weeks

Fireworks found “unauthorized use of internal Fireworks credentials” at 9am Pacific time on 6 October, began notifying customers the next morning and published its first bulletin on 9 October. At first it reported that environment variables, “including API keys and tokens stored as secrets”, had been captured from evaluation jobs in “a limited number of customer accounts”. It warned those customers that “removing a stored secret alone does not invalidate the underlying credential”: a key held at Fireworks for another service had to be revoked at that service.[5]

Its update of 9 November widened the picture: account and billing information, and for a limited set of accounts secrets, datasets and incomplete model weights. It also described a second way in. A third-party cloud provider hosting Fireworks’ research machines had an incident on 23 October; on 24 October the intruder used it to reach Fireworks’ development machines and run a workload “that led to additional customer data impact”. Fireworks says it has detected no further successful access to the platform customers use since 25 October, and no impact on its inference service, which keeps no data by default.[6]

Notion used Fireworks for classification jobs behind its Insights feature and to serve open-weight models. Fireworks told it on the evening of 2 November that a small set of data, synthetic test data, had been accessed; on 6 November that customer data might have been; and on 8 November confirmed it. The new set held Notion AI chat transcripts from fewer than 1% of workspaces, which for most were “unattributable”: not labelled with a user or workspace.[7] Cursor’s account, which we covered in [our Note of 16 November](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/cursor-fireworks-key-fake-claude-code-extension-5000-users), begins with “an access key we had issued to Fireworks” that “was exposed by Fireworks”, and ends with a fake extension on its marketplace cache.[8]

**Figure: Fireworks found the intrusion on 6 October; its customers were still learning what was taken five weeks later**

*Dates in the bulletins and filings of Fireworks AI, Uber, Cursor and Notion, 1 October to 10 November 2026*

| Date | Event | Detail |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 Oct 2026 | Uber’s breach date | As filed in Oregon; 7 October in California |
| 6 Oct 2026 | Fireworks finds misuse | Its own internal credentials, used by an outsider |
| 9 Oct 2026 | Uber told | Severs its data connections to the vendor |
| 13 Oct 2026 | Uber confirms | Its data was accessed with the stolen credentials |
| 29 Oct 2026 | Fake extension at Cursor | About 11 hours; at most 5,000 users |
| 2 Nov 2026 | Notion told | Cuts Fireworks off by the next morning |
| 8 Nov 2026 | Notion’s transcripts confirmed | Fewer than 1% of workspaces |
| 10 Nov 2026 | Uber’s letters | 149,346 people, in its Oregon filing |

Source: Oregon DOJ; Uber letter; Fireworks AI bulletins of 9 October and 9 November; Cursor, 13 November; Notion, 9 November 2026 · as of 17 November 2026

What each customer had shared with Fireworks, and what it says was taken:

| Customer | What it shared with Fireworks | What was taken, as stated | Scale, as stated |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Uber | Data connected to its account with the vendor | Names, addresses, dates of birth, driver’s licence numbers (TechCrunch) | 149,346 people notified |
| Notion | Insights classification jobs; open-weight model serving | Notion AI chat transcripts, mostly not tied to a user or workspace | Fewer than 1% of workspaces |
| Cursor | A key to a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces | Traces, unredacted credentials in a few, then support data and archived code | Traces of fewer than 0.05% of users; fake extension to at most 5,000 |
| Other Fireworks customers | Secrets in evaluation jobs; account and billing data | API keys and tokens; billing data; some datasets and incomplete models | “A limited number of customer accounts” |

## Barracuda: a different AI vendor, and a key nobody retired

Barracuda, the security company, describes the same kind of opening with a different vendor. “As part of a previous project, we provided a cloud access key to a third-party vendor.”[9]

> “We did not retire the key when the vendor — a company working in AI — finished that work. That is on us.”Arve Kjoelen, Barracuda's chief information security officer, 11 November 2026

Its advisory, updated on 13 November, says the key sat in a configuration file in the vendor’s GitHub repository, exposed when the vendor’s development environment was compromised in October.[10] The first call with it came at 04:33 on 1 November. The attacker read stored secrets, among them AWS access keys and Azure service principal secrets, and used each to reach the next system: from cloud accounts to a data-analytics system, to a source-code access token, to Kubernetes clusters. In the early hours of 2 November it pushed short-lived branches to a handful of code repositories to trigger a build workflow “written to print the build system’s secrets into the job log”, encoded so the log’s masking would not hide them. The last activity was at 23:31 that day. It also mounted a server’s file system from a container, and tried, without success, to create an administrator identity for itself. Commands it ran searched for cryptocurrency wallet files; none existed on those systems.[9]

**Figure: One unretired key took an attacker through about 10 cloud accounts in about 44 hours**

*Barracuda's intrusion as Barracuda measured it, 1 to 4 November 2026*

~44h

of attacker activity, 04:33 on 1 November to 23:31 on 2 November

Barracuda

~10

cloud accounts touched

Barracuda

4

systems chained: cloud, analytics, a source-code token, Kubernetes

Barracuda

2 days

after the start, the vendor’s warning arrived; the activity had already stopped

Barracuda

Source: Barracuda, 'Forty-four hours: Anatomy of a machine-speed intrusion', 11 November 2026 · as of 17 November 2026

Barracuda found it on 4 November, when an engineer noticed unusual activity on their own account; the vendor contacted Barracuda the same day about its own incident, though it did not believe Barracuda had been affected. One system the attacker reached stores the credentials Barracuda XDR uses to collect data from customers’ Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and other connected systems. Barracuda found no direct evidence they were viewed, but its logging there “was not detailed enough to rule it out”, so it asked the customers concerned to revoke and recreate those credentials and to review activity from 1 November.[9][10]

ReportedNot Fireworks

Barracuda calls its vendor “a company working in AI” and does not name it. We do not link it to Fireworks or to any other company. Barracuda says the techniques tell it how the attacker operated, “not who it was”.[9]

## The pattern, in the companies’ own words, and what each changed

Railway, the app-hosting platform whose customers’ stolen AI keys ran up an estimated US$740,000 (the subject of [our Note of 11 November](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/railway-740000-ai-bill-stolen-keys)), wrote that OpenCode, Warp, Fireworks AI and several others disclosed similar thefts between 6 and 23 October: “We assess this to be one of a series of attacks on platforms that hold AI keys.”[11] Barracuda put the lesson as a rule: “Long-lived keys, especially those held by third parties, are pre-positioned access for an attacker. Short-lived, narrowly scoped credentials would have stopped this intrusion at its first step.”[9] Cursor described its own exposure as “data we stored and shared, credentials we issued, and systems we operate”.[8]

**Figure: Each company was reached through access it had handed a vendor; each says it has cut or shortened that access**

*Access given to AI vendors, and the changes each company announced, October to November 2026*

How the access worked

- A cloud key given to a vendor for a project and left live after the work ended (Barracuda)
- A key issued to a vendor to read a shared bucket of coding-agent traces (Cursor)
- Customer data held in an account at the vendor, open to the vendor’s own credentials (Uber)
- Customers’ keys for other services stored as secrets in the vendor’s evaluation jobs (Fireworks)

What they say they changed

- Barracuda: long-lived and over-privileged keys removed; vendors’ credentials expired when engagements end
- Cursor: inference moved off Fireworks; every internal credential rotated; secret scanning; network limits so stolen credentials fail outside their intended location
- Notion and Uber: Fireworks cut off; Notion deleted its data there, switched Insights off and stopped serving open-weight models through it
- Fireworks: credentials replaced, new ones harder to create, self-serve dataset uploads and downloads switched off

Source: Barracuda, 11 and 13 November; Cursor, 13 November; Notion, 9 November; Uber letter, 10 November; Fireworks AI, 9 November 2026 · as of 17 November 2026

Barracuda is also moving its XDR integration credentials to a store that stays protected “even if cluster administration is compromised” and adding data-access logging where it was missing.[10] Notion tells affected customers to rotate any passwords, API keys or other credentials pasted into Notion AI during the incident.[7]

Our viewWhat to check before the next renewal

A list of every key and data feed each AI vendor holds, with an expiry date tied to the contract. Uber’s case shows the limit of the customer’s own alerts when the vendor’s credentials are used, so the vendor’s notice terms (who tells whom, how fast) matter as much as the customer’s own monitoring. And a key stored at a vendor stays valid until the service that issued it revokes it, as Fireworks told its customers. Our [third-party risk analysis](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/third-party-risk-management-security-ratings-must) sets out what assessments and ratings cover and what they cost.

In India: the six-hour clock starts when the vendor calls

None of these notices gives an Indian figure. Uber’s count comes from US state filings, and Fireworks, Notion, Cursor and Barracuda give no country breakdown. The Indian rules still apply to an Indian company in the same position. CERT-In’s directions of 28 April 2022 require a body corporate to report listed incidents within six hours “of noticing such incidents or being brought to notice about such incidents”, and the list includes data breaches, data leaks, unauthorised access to IT systems or data, and attacks on systems “related to Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning”. On that wording, the clock runs from a vendor’s notice, such as the one Uber received on 9 October.[12]

Under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, a data fiduciary is responsible for processing done on its behalf by a data processor “irrespective of any agreement to the contrary” (section 8(1)).[13] The government notified the DPDP Rules on 14 November 2025 with an eighteen-month period for phased compliance; the Act allows penalties of up to ₹250 crore for failing to keep reasonable security safeguards and up to ₹200 crore for not notifying the Data Protection Board or affected people of a breach.[14]

How we did this

Figures as of 17 November 2026, 10:30pm IST

The 149,346, the breach and discovery dates and the notice date are from the Oregon Department of Justice’s breach list as read on 17 November; the 7 October breach date from the California Attorney General’s entry; the chain, the dates of 9 and 13 October and the Rhode Island count from Uber’s sample letter of 10 November. The data fields, the vendor’s name and the alerts statement are TechCrunch’s report of what Uber filed and said (first published 13 November, updated 16 November), because the letter leaves the data fields as a placeholder and names no vendor. The 1.25% (1,873 of 149,346) is our arithmetic. Fireworks’ times are Pacific Daylight Time as it gives them. Barracuda’s clock times are as published, without a time zone; its first and last logged times are about 43 hours apart, and it describes the run as roughly 44 hours. Cursor’s and Notion’s percentages are upper bounds in their own words (“less than”, “fewer than”). Cursor does not say when Fireworks told it. Barracuda’s vendor is unnamed and is not linked here to Fireworks. The companies’ descriptions of who the attackers might be, and of the tools they used, are left out: none names an attacker, and neither do we. The Indian rules are quoted from the CERT-In directions, the Act and the Press Information Bureau’s backgrounder on the Rules.

Spotted an error? Write to us; corrections are published at the foot of the piece.

Sources

1. [Oregon Department of Justice: Data breach notifications list (Uber Technologies, Inc.)](https://justice.oregon.gov/consumer/databreach/) — entry reported 10 November 2026; read 17 November 2026
2. [California Attorney General: Submitted breach notification sample, Uber Technologies, Inc.](https://oag.ca.gov/ecrime/databreach/reports/sb24-632751) — November 2026 (breach date 7 October 2026)
3. [Uber Technologies: Notice of security incident (sample letter filed with the California Attorney General)](https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/Multistate%20Template%20-%20Final.pdf) — 10 November 2026
4. [TechCrunch: Uber says hackers stole information on close to 150,000 driver’s licenses during data breach](https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/16/uber-confirms-hackers-stole-thousands-of-drivers-license-information-in-data-breach/) — first published 13 November 2026; updated 16 November 2026
5. [Fireworks AI: October 2026 security incident (security bulletin)](https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident) — 9 October 2026, last updated 10 October 2026
6. [Fireworks AI: Update on October 2026 security incident](https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update) — 9 November 2026
7. [Notion: Fireworks AI incident (security advisory)](https://www.notion.com/security/advisories/security-incident-involving-a-third-party-ai-vendor-nov9) — 9 November 2026
8. [Cursor: An update on our recent security incident](https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update) — 13 November 2026
9. [Barracuda: Forty-four hours: Anatomy of a machine-speed intrusion](https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion) — 11 November 2026
10. [Barracuda Trust Center: Barracuda XDR integration credentials (advisory)](https://trust.barracuda.com/security/barracuda-xdr-integration-credentials) — 10 November 2026, updated 13 November 2026
11. [Railway: Incident report: October 21st security attack](https://blog.railway.com/p/incident-report-october-security-incident) — 10 November 2026
12. [CERT-In: Directions under section 70B(6) of the IT Act, 2000 (reporting of cyber incidents)](https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/CERT-In_Directions_70B_28.04.2022.pdf) — 28 April 2022
13. [Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, section 8 (duties of a Data Fiduciary)](https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf) — 11 August 2023
14. [Press Information Bureau: DPDP Rules, 2025 notified (backgrounder)](https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/nov/doc20251117695301.pdf) — 17 November 2025

**Disclosure.** TechBag is a software reseller: it earns when companies buy through it, including from vendors named here. The analysis is TechBag’s own; no vendor paid for or saw this piece before publication. Facts are labelled reported, TechBag count or our view.

**Read this next:** [Stolen AI keys ran up US$1 million bills; one reseller sold ‘unlimited’ for US$60 a month](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/stolen-ai-keys-1-million-bills-llmjacking) — What stolen AI keys are used for: tested, resold and billed, with bills of up to US$1 million, and the settings that cap the damage.

Go deeper on TechBag

- [Third parties were in 48% of breaches; 1 of 5 TPRM pricing pages shows a price](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/third-party-risk-management-security-ratings-must) — what vendor assessments and security ratings cover, and what they cost
- [HashiCorp Vault](https://www.thetechbag.com/hashicorp/hashicorp-vault) — short-lived, scoped credentials in place of keys that outlive a project
- [CyberArk Vendor PAM](https://www.thetechbag.com/cyberark/cyberark-vendor-pam) — third-party access that ends when the engagement does
